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SALT IN THE WOUNDS: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS
SURROUNDING THE TCJA SALT DEDUCTION CAP
Carmella R. Campisano*
I. INTRODUCTION
“The United States Senate just passed the biggest in history Tax Cut
and Reform Bill. Terrible Individual Mandate (ObamaCare)Repealed [sic].
Goes to the House tomorrow morning for final vote. If approved, there will
be a News Conference at The White House at approximately 1:00 P.M.”1
And with a tweet, sent out shortly after 1:00 a.m., Donald Trump
announced one of the most expansive legislative enactments of his
presidency thus far, tax legislation informally known as the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (the “TCJA”). This enactment would be the first major change to
the tax code since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.2
Unlike most tax bills, the TCJA made its way through both the House
of Representatives (the “House”) and the Senate at near record speed, with
its referral to the House Committee on Ways and Means on November 2,
2017,3 and its signature into law on December 22, 2017.4 Its meteoric rise
left most taxpayers and members of Congress completely in the dark as to
the impact these reforms would have, both on those paying the tax and the
national government relying on the tax revenue. Time has also failed to
further elucidate the short- and long-term impacts these changes will have.
Nowhere, however, is this uncertainty as compelling as with the
amendments to the state and local tax (“SALT”) deductions.5
This Comment will examine the new SALT deduction cap and its
impact. In light of the potential consequences, it will argue that changes to
*
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Jersey. I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Professor Tracy Kaye,
for her guidance and support in the writing of this Comment. I would also like to thank my
parents for inspiration, guidance, and support throughout my writing process.
1
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:09 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/943362605258813441.
2
See infra Part III.
3
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017).
4
An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054
(2017) [hereinafter Tax Cuts and Jobs Act].
5
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 4, at 2085–86.
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the new SALT amendments are necessary. Because the attempts being
made by various states to circumvent the law are likely to fail, the best
alternative is amendment of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “the
Code”). Instead of just applying a blanket cap of $10,000 on all SALT
deductions, the deduction should instead phase out based on the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income (“AGI”) to the capped deduction of $10,000. Part II
will provide background on deductions generally and the SALT deduction
specifically. Part III will look at the differences between the new and the
old deduction and examine the legislative intentions behind each. Part IV
will look at the potential and current impact of the cap on taxpayers, states,
and businesses. Part V will examine the various legislative workarounds
that high-property-value states have enacted to lessen the impact on their
taxpayers through legislation. Part VI will examine the lawsuit that highproperty-value states have filed against the Secretary of the Treasury to
invalidate the provision. Part VII, considering the likely impact of the cap
and the remote chance that any other attempt at reform will affect the Code,
will propose a more equitable reformation of the current tax code that will
not hurt certain geographic areas the way the current law does. Finally,
Part VIII will conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
Under the United States’ progressive income tax system, taxes are
computed as a graduated percentage of individual’s taxable income at
increasing rates.6 Taxable income comprises the taxpayer’s gross income
less applicable deductions.7 This taxable income is then taxed at
“increasing marginal rates of tax; for example, 10% on the first $10,000 of
taxable income, 15% on the second $10,000, 30% on the third $10,000, and
so forth.”8 The resulting amount, less any credits the taxpayer may have, is
his or her tax obligation.9 Deductions function to lower the taxpayer’s
taxable income, and thus his or her overall tax obligation.10
“Above-the-line” deductions are subtracted from gross income to
reach the taxpayer’s AGI.11 Common “above-the-line” deductions include
student loan interest12 and trade or business expenses.13 These deductions
6
STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2018 3 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter “JCT Overview”].
7
Id.
8
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 12 n.31 (1998).
9
JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 3.
10
Id.
11
26 U.S.C. § 62(a) (2018).
12
Id. § 221(a).
13
Id. § 162(a).
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can be taken regardless of whether the taxpayer ultimately utilizes the
standard deduction or itemizes “below-the-line.”14
After determining AGI, the taxpayer can take a “below-the-line”
deduction, in addition to “above-the-line” deductions.15 The first option for
the taxpayer’s “below-the-line” deduction is the standard deduction, which
is an applicable standard amount that corresponds to the taxpayer’s filing
status.16 In 2018, for those “filing single” the deduction was $12,000.17
For “married, filing jointly” the deduction was $24,000.18 For “married,
filing separately” the deduction was $12,000.19 Finally, for “head of
household” the deduction was $18,000.20 For every filing status, these
deductions are almost a twofold increase over the prior year’s standard
deduction amounts.21
The other option for the taxpayer’s “below-the-line” deduction is to
itemize personal deductions, which allows the taxpayer to add together
certain qualifying expenses, such as charitable contributions,22 medical
expenses,23 state income and property taxes,24 and mortgage interest25 and
deduct this amount from his or her AGI. Certain deductions have floors,
which means that only the excess over a set percentage of the taxpayer’s
AGI is deductible.26 Others have ceilings, which limit the amount that can
be taken to a percentage of the taxpayer’s AGI.27 Taxpayers may take
either the standard deduction or they may itemize, but not both.28 The
determination will turn on whether the taxpayer’s allowable itemized

14

JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.
Id.
16
Id.
17
26 U.S.C. § 63(c)(7).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. § 63(c)(2)(A).
21
Id. § 63(c)(2).
22
Id. § 170 (allowing deduction of contributions to qualifying charitable entities but
limited to a percentage of the taxpayer’s AGI depending on the character of the
contribution).
23
26 U.S.C. § 213 (allowing deductions for qualifying expenses in excess of 10% of
AGI as of January 1, 2019).
24
Id. § 164 (allowing up to a $10,000 deduction for state property and income taxes
paid).
25
Id. § 163 (allowing a deduction for the interest paid on the acquisition indebtedness
up to $750,000 for a qualifying residence).
26
See, e.g., id. § 213(a) (floor for medical interest deductions is 7.5% of AGI for 2018
and 10% of AGI thereafter).
27
See, e.g., id. § 170 (allowing a deduction for charitable contributions subject to a
ceiling based on the taxpayer’s AGI and the type of property donated).
28
Id. § 63(b).
15
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deductions exceed the applicable standard deduction.29
The TCJA, with a focus on simplification, has greatly increased the
amount of the standard deduction, making it more likely that taxpayers will
utilize this method over itemization.30 Prior to the TCJA, in 2014, thirty
percent of taxpayers itemized and the rest took the standard deduction.31
While the number of taxpayers that will itemize is expected to decrease
because of the TCJA, it is still anticipated that around 20.4 million
taxpayers will itemize in 2018.32 Thus, changes to IRC regarding
itemization still have the potential to impact many taxpayers.33
Under the IRC, by means of the itemized personal deductions
discussed above, taxpayers are permitted to deduct expenditures on state
and local taxes.34 These deductions consist of payments to state and local
government for real estate and personal property taxes, in addition to either
income taxes or general sales taxes, which are “tax[es] imposed at one rate
with respect to the sale at retail of . . . items.”35 Most notably, the
deduction for these payments is widely taken in states with high income
taxes, high property taxes, or both, like New Jersey, New York, Maryland,
and Connecticut.36 The fact that property tax payments in these states are
higher means that the itemization of deductions is likely to be greater than
the use of the standard deduction for those states’ taxpayers. For example,
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York came in first, second,
third, and thirteenth, respectively, in the nation in the overall percentage of
tax returns that itemized in 2005.37
While the SALT deduction has long been a part of the IRC, debate
continues as to whether the deduction should continue and, if so, whether

29

JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4. See also 26 U.S.C. § 63(b).
JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4. In addition to increasing the amount the average
taxpayer will get to deduct, the new standard deduction provision will allow for greater
deductions for the elderly and blind. Id. By Joint Committee on Taxation calculations, it
will be an additional deduction of $2,600 or $3,200 as applicable for those taxpayer groups.
Id.
31
Chenxi Lu, Itemized Deductions, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/itemized-deductions/full.
32
JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.
33
Id.
34
ALAN PRIGAL, 1 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FED. TAX GUIDEBOOK § 1.03 (2019),
LexisNexis.
35
26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2018); see also id. §164(b)(5)(B).
36
Scott Ahroni et al., Congress and the SALT Deduction Past, Present, and Future,
CPA J. (Jan. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/01/22/congress-salt-deduction/. See
also Gerald Prante, Most Americans Don’t Itemize on Their Tax Returns, TAX FOUND. 1
(July 23, 2007), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff95.pdf. This fact will have
particular impact on the current legal challenge to the law. See discussion infra Part VI.
37
Prante, supra note 36, at 1.
30
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full deductibility is still justified.38 On the one hand, opponents of the
SALT deduction’s inclusion in the tax code argue that these deductions are
really just payments for personal services received and, therefore, should
not be deductible.39 This argument relies on the assumption that those
taxpayers in high-tax states are receiving more and/or better services and
should have to pay accordingly.40 There is also the concern that allowing
the deduction cuts against the federalist make-up of our government based
on the idea that, if states are allowed higher spending through what is
essentially a federal subsidy (in the form of this deduction), there will be
decreased ability for federal spending.41 Finally, there is the argument that,
as with any deduction, it benefits the wealthy more than any other group of
taxpayers.42 This argument relies on the assumption that those with a
greater wherewithal to pay should be taxed accordingly. 43 Therefore, the
tax system should target benefits towards those with lower incomes.
On the other side of the debate, proponents of the SALT deduction
argue that because these taxes are not really disposable income, disallowing
the deduction would equate to double taxation, as taxpayers are being taxed
on the same income twice.44 Additionally, there is the idea, fundamental to
the US tax structure, that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed
similarly.45 If two people in the same income bracket, but in different
states, were paying differing amounts of state tax, they would not be taxed
similarly. Further, on the other side of the federalism argument entertained
by the SALT deduction’s opponents, disallowing deductibility would
reduce a high-tax state resident’s wherewithal to pay high state and local
38
See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded
Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 807 (2008).
39
Id. at 808. See also Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State
and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 422 (1996)
(articulating the view held by some commenters that the more related to services received
the more like consumption and, thus, ineligible for a deduction).
40
Kaplow, supra note 39, at 422.
41
Galle, supra note 38, at 809. See also Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax
Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1411 (2004).
42
See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX
REV. 327, 335 (2016). The value of a deduction to a taxpayer is the amount times the rate at
which their last dollar is taxed. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax
Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
679, 693 n.43 (1976). Because higher income will result in the last dollar taxed at a higher
amount, the value of the deduction will be higher for those with more income. See id. This
concept is usually referred to as an “upside-down” subsidy. See id.
43
See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 42, at 693.
44
Ahroni, supra note 36.
45
Galle, supra note 38, at 807. But see Randall J. Gingiss, Forcing Tax Fairness in
State Taxation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41, 52 (2007) (arguing that fairness cuts the other way
and the deduction forces those in low-tax states to subsidize those in high-tax states).
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taxes.46 This deprives the states of revenue and limits their ability to run
their governments in a manner of their choosing. In the same vein, it is
argued that eliminating the SALT deduction could lead to a less
progressive state tax system, as it would inhibit states’ ability to tax their
very wealthy.47 Finally, there is the argument that these higher taxes are
paid for receipt of services. The counterargument, however, is that those
with higher incomes or higher property values living in the same locality as
taxpayers with lower income and lower property values receive the same
services.48 Thus, state and local taxes cannot truly be said to be received
for services.49
Irrespective of which argument is ultimately correct, lawmakers have
clearly felt that preserving the deduction serves the aims of taxation, as it
has remained an enduring component of the American tax system since the
first federal income tax in 1913.50 To illustrate, in 2015, of the thirty
percent of taxpayers that itemized, ninety-five percent of them utilized the
SALT deduction.51 Considering the endurance and importance of this
deduction, any change to it merits careful examination for any unintended
consequences it may cause, as well as the clear impact it will have on
taxpayers and localities.
III. OLD LAW VERSUS NEW LAW
In order to understand the impact of the cap, it is important to first
analyze how the TCJA changed the SALT deduction and also the intent
behind both the new and the old versions of the SALT deduction. Section
A will look at the IRC’s treatment of the SALT deduction prior to the
TCJA and Section B will examine the legislative intent behind the prior
law. Section C will examine the IRC’s treatment of the SALT deduction
after the TCJA’s enactment and Section D will discuss the legislative intent
behind the TCJA and the SALT deduction amendment.
A. Pre-TCJA SALT Deduction
Formerly, section 164 of the IRC explained that:
Tracy Gordon, The Price We Pay for Capping the SALT Deduction, TAX POL’Y CTR.
15,
2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/price-we-pay-capping-saltdeduction.
47
Id.
48
Kaplow, supra note 39, at 423.
49
Id.
50
Julianna Surane, Legislative History of The SALT Deduction, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N
2018 MID-YEAR MEETING, SAN DIEGO 1–2 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/da
m/aba/events/taxation/taxiq/mid18/taxiq-18mid-tps-perspectives-lang-paper.pdf.
51
Lori Robertson, The Facts on the SALT Deduction, FACTCHECK.ORG (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/11/facts-salt-deduction/.
46

(Feb.
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[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the following
taxes shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year within
which paid or accrued: (1) State and local, and foreign, real
property taxes. (2) State and local personal property taxes. (3)
State and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess
profits taxes. (4) The [general sales tax] imposed on income
distributions. . . .52
Personal property taxes are ad valorem, meaning those taxes are “based on
criteria other than value,”53 and are imposed on an annual basis in respect
to all personal property.54 State or local taxes are the taxes “imposed by a
State, a possession of the United States, or a political subdivision of any of
the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia.”55
This section of the Code also provids that taxpayers can deduct state
and local sales tax instead of state and local income tax.56 General sales tax
is defined as “a tax imposed at one rate with respect to the sale at retail of a
broad range of classes of items,” and there is no deduction for sales tax
imposed “at a rate other than the general rate of tax” unless there is a lower
tax rate in the case of food, clothing, medical supplies, and motor
vehicles.57 Under this regime, there was no strict cap imposed on the
amount of such taxes that could be deducted.
B. Legislative Intent Behind Previous SALT Deduction
The SALT deduction has been a part of the United States’ taxation
scheme since the first federal income tax.58 Even before that, however, the
Tariff Act of 1862 imposed a national tax.59 Intended to finance the Civil
War efforts, the Tariff Act of 1862 provided for a tax on income and
allowed certain deductions, one of which was for state and local taxes on
property and income.60 In 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment was
ratified, removing the constitutional barrier to the federal income tax, the
deductibility of state and local taxes remained.61 This included federal
income tax, state income and property tax, and miscellaneous excises on

52

26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2018).
7 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 27:7 (Westlaw 2019) [hereinafter
MERTENS].
54
26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(1).
55
Id. § 164(b)(2).
56
Id. § 164(b)(5)(A).
57
Id. § 164(b)(5)(B)–(D).
58
Surane, supra note 50, at 2.
59
Id.
60
Id. See also Daniel Hemel, The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax
Deduction, 72 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3).
61
See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II (B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
53
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liquor, tobacco, gasoline, and sales tax.62 The deduction for federal income
tax was quickly eliminated in 1917, however.63
In 1921, the Revenue Act provided for the general deductibility of
taxes with a number of exceptions.64 This broadened the deduction by
covering taxes not covered by specific exceptions under the prior regime.65
Prior to 1942, the states lacked uniformity with regard to taxing methods,
as some imposed different mixtures of property, income, and sales taxes.66
In the 1942 Act, Congress responded to these variations by creating a
deduction for state and local retail taxes.67 Further, with the highest
brackets between the years 1942 and 1963 ranging anywhere from eightyeight to ninety-four percent, the deduction for state and local taxes was
thought necessary to prevent taxes “from exceeding 100 percent” of
income.68
The Revenue Act of 1964 marked the first major, but ultimately
unsuccessful, attack on the SALT deduction.69 It did, however, succeed in
limiting the deduction further than any amendment had previously done, as
it eliminated the deduction for miscellaneous taxes for excises on liquor
and tobacco.70 Initially, Congress did feel that allowing the deduction of
other state and local taxes was more burdensome for the taxpayers
considering that these taxes were difficult to keep track of and there was a
favorable tradeoff in sacrificing these deductions for a lower tax rate.71
The final iteration of this bill, however, allowed the deduction of “state and
local taxes on real property, personal property, income, general sales, and
gasoline and other motor fuels.”72 This underscored their importance in
preventing a shift of the federal tax burden between homeowners and nonhomeowners and avoided putting a heavy burden on the taxpayers.73
Congress also slated the state and local gasoline tax for elimination in
1978, but it ultimately survived after its proposed elimination faced strong
dissent from those that feared the adverse impact it would have on the

62

ROBERT M. WILLAN, INCOME TAXES: CONCISE HISTORY AND PRIMER I-3 (1994).
Id. See generally Surane, supra note 50.
64
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §214(a)(3), 42 Stat. 227, 239–40 (1921).
65
See id.
66
MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2. See also Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,
56 Stat. 798 (1942).
67
MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2.
68
Surane, supra note 50, at 4.
69
WILLAN, supra note 62, at I-3. See generally Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88272, § 207, 78 Stat. 19, 40–43 (1964).
70
WILLAN, supra note 62, at I-3.
71
Surane, supra note 50, at 5.
72
Surane, supra note 50, at 6.
73
Surane, supra note 50, at 4–5.
63
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middle-income taxpayers who itemized.74
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ushered in the biggest change to both
the tax code and the SALT deduction prior to the TCJA.75 The goals of this
reform were purportedly simplicity, fairness, and growth and would entail a
decrease in tax rates with an attempt to broaden the tax base.76 President
Reagan initially proposed elimination of the SALT deduction, as he felt the
federal government was essentially subsidizing state and local cost
expenditures and that this would be a good way to broaden the tax base.77
Opponents of the SALT deduction also felt that there were equitable
concerns, in that this deduction was more beneficial to those in high-tax
states.78 Additionally, there was no longer the need for the deduction to
prevent the tax rate from going over 100 percent that there previously was,
as the rates were being lowered at this time.79 Finally, opponents of the
SALT deduction argued that this was not double taxation because
taxpayers could change the amount of local taxes they paid either through
elections or by moving out of that jurisdiction.80
Arguments against repealing the deduction focused on the fact that it
both indirectly benefitted the poor and directly benefitted middle-income
taxpayers.81 Lawmakers were also concerned about these changes
incentivizing residents to move to low-tax jurisdictions.82 Both sides
expressed concerns, on the one hand about how the influx would burden
the system and on the other, how less residents would affect the high-tax
states’ economies.83
Congress ultimately considered both that the
deduction lowered voter resistance to higher taxes and that these higher
taxes provided beneficial social services,84 and in the end, found the SALT
deduction valuable enough to retain to a large extent, keeping all but state
and local sales tax deductions.85
The Joint Committee on Taxation stated that this change was justified
74

Surane, supra note 50, at 6–7.
See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
76
Federal Income Tax Deduction for State and Local Taxes: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th
Cong. 1 (1985) [hereinafter “Senate Hearings 1985”]; STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION ON THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 47–48 (Comm. Print
1987) [hereinafter “JCT Bluebook”].
77
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 36. See also Surane, supra note 50, at 7–8.
78
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 36–37.
79
Surane, supra note 50, at 7.
80
Surane, supra note 50, at 8.
81
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 50, 88.
82
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 18–19.
83
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 20.
84
Surane, supra note 50, at 9.
85
JCT Bluebook, supra note 76, at 7.
75
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by improved consistency and the unfairness of the deduction on sales tax
because it favored certain consumption patterns.86 This change did not last,
however. In 2004, the SALT provisions would again allow an election
between the deduction of the general sales tax and income tax.87 The new
election created a more equitable system that took into account the different
states’ methods of taxing.88
Thus, throughout its history, the SALT deduction has focused on
striking a balance of fairness across states, while also minimizing the
burden the middle-class would face because of taxation at the state and
federal level. Up until the TCJA, however, the latter concern was the usual
winner.
C. Post-TCJA SALT Deduction
The revised section 164 under the TCJA provides, in the relevant part,
“for years 2018–2025 the aggregate amounts accounted for under
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) and paragraph (5) for any
taxable year shall not exceed $10,000, or $5,000 in the case of a married
individual filing separately.”89 In other words, an individual’s state, local,
and foreign real property taxes; state and local personal property taxes; and
state and local and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profit taxes and
general sales taxes are only deductible up to $10,000 or $5,000, depending
on filing status.90
In essence, taxpayers went from being able to deduct the full amount
of their state and local property and income taxes under section 164 to
being capped at $10,000 regardless of their AGI or other unique tax
features. While this provision will phase out in 2025,91 it could create
problems in the intervening years.92
D. Legislative Intent Behind the TCJA
The main goals behind the TCJA were “bringing tax cuts for
hardworking, middle-income Americans; eliminating unfair loopholes and
deductions; and slashing business taxes so employers can create jobs, raise
wages, and dominate their competition around the world.”93 In fact, these
86

Id.
MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2; Hemel, supra note 60, at 5.
88
MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2.
89
26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) (2018).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Additionally, TCJA Phase 2 could make these changes permanent if passed. Renu
Zaretsky, TCJA Phase 2 and a Tariff Affirmation, TAX POL’Y CTR. (July 25, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/daily-deduction/tcja-phase-2-and-tariff-affirmation.
93
Press Release, Donald Trump, Statement from the President on the Tax Cuts and
87
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tax goals were foreshadowed by speeches that President Trump made on
his campaign trail.94
These goals played a prominent role in discussions when the TCJA
finally came before Congress.95 Specifically, discussions behind the SALT
provision centered around striking a balance of fairness to the middle-class
and fairness among states.96 While these two were separate themes to an
extent, there was a lot of interaction between them. 97 Generally, the cap on
the SALT deduction will affect the middle-class more in states with higher
income taxes and higher property values than it will in lower income states
with lower property values because it is unlikely that this cap would affect
many outside the high-income earners in the lower income states.98 In
congressional discussions, tensions arose between low- and high-tax states,
with low-tax states arguing that higher taxes were simply payment by the
taxpayers for receiving the more plentiful services the high-tax states
provide, such as free garbage pick-up, better roads, and better education
systems.99 On the other side of that, though, senators from high-tax states
pushed back because of the very real impact the cap would have on
residents of those states, many of them middle-income-earners.100 In
making these arguments, the senators underscored the fact that businesses
would not face this cap and the fact that much of the money paid by hightax state taxpayers went towards subsidizing low-tax states.101
Jobs Act (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statementpresident-tax-cuts-jobs-act/.
94
See, e.g., Donald Trump, Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club (Aug. 8, 2016)
(discussing plans for tax reform to benefit middle-class tax payers and the simplification of
tax preparation); Donald Trump, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York at the
Waldorf Astoria in New York City (Sept. 15, 2016) (discussing tax effect on families and
complexity of tax preparation).
95
See generally 163 CONG. REC. S7653 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017); 163 CONG. REC.
S7507, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. H9602 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2017); 163
CONG. REC. H9380 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017).
96
163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7663, 7682 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017).
97
163 CONG. REC. S7507, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 7542 (Senator Toomey of Pennsylvania questioned “how it could possibly be
fair to force [his] constituents . . . [that] have relatively modest services and pay a modest
amount of taxes [to] pay more in income taxes to subsidize someone who gets to live in a
multimillion dollar condo in the Upper West Side of Manhattan.”).
100
163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7663, 7662–63 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017) (Senator Menendez
of New Jersey underscored that “[i]n 2015 alone, nearly 1.8 million New Jersey households
deducted a combined $32 billion in State, local, and property taxes from their Federal tax
bill. These families aren’t living large. These are middle-class folks who had to work hard
for every dollar they have.”).
101
Id. at 7663 (Senator Menendez of New Jersey pointing out that if the SALT
deduction is important enough to be preserved for businesses, “Republicans should
understand why it is so important for middle class families.”). See also 163 CONG. REC.
H9602, 9607 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. H9380, 9392 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
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Based on these discussions, it appears that the main intent of the
SALT cap provision, as enacted, is to avoid inordinately burdening middleand lower-income taxpayers, while simultaneously preventing high-tax
states from shifting the cost of the services they provide to their residents
onto the federal government or other states.102 The contrary position is that
this cap will unduly burden certain groups of taxpayers and create
unintended consequences for those taxpayers and the country at large.
Finally, on the federal level, there is the concern of bringing in enough
revenue to support the government. Considering the other numerous
changes enacted in this legislation that have the potential to decrease
revenue, provisions to counteract that are of great importance. Overall, in
light of both these concerns and justifications, Congress enacted the cap.103
IV. IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM
While it is unclear exactly what the impact of the SALT deduction cap
will be, projections envision the effects reaching taxpayers, both
individuals and corporations, as well as governmental bodies.104 Section A
will look at the impact of the cap on taxpayers and Section B will look at
the impact on governmental agencies.
A. Impact on Taxpayers
Among taxpayers, the deduction cap will have different implications
because the SALT deduction remains in full force for businesses, while it is
limited to $10,000 for individual taxpayers.105 Subsection 1 will look at the
anticipated impact on individuals and subsection 2 will look at the
anticipated impact for corporations.
1. Individuals
Clearly, the reform will mean a higher tax bill for some taxpayers.106
For example, thirteen percent of New York taxpayers, eleven percent of
New Jersey taxpayers, twelve percent of Maryland taxpayers, and nine
percent of Connecticut taxpayers will see a tax hike in 2019.107

2017).
102

163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 4, at 2085–86.
104
See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
105
26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) (2018).
106
The Final Trump-GOP Tax Bill: National & 50-State Analysis, INST. TAX’N & ECON.
POL’Y tbl. 2 (Dec. 2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/Trump-GOP-Final-BillReport.pdf.
107
Id.
103
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Representative Josh Gottheimer of New Jersey expects the SALT cap
to “kill” property values in his state.108 According to Moody’s Analytics,
Essex County, New Jersey is anticipated to be among one of the hardest hit
counties affected by the new tax law.109 Essex County has a median
household income of $76,000 but residents pay on average more than
$10,000 in property tax.110 Thus, many of those who will experience a tax
increase are middle-income taxpayers, as well.
Moody’s Analytics is also anticipating the cap to impact home prices
nationally by 2019, with home prices four percent lower than if there were
no tax bill.111 Furthermore, would-be homeowners may be hesitant to
purchase because of the increased cost of maintaining a home. 112 This also
means decreased construction as fewer people build homes, especially in
high-tax areas.113 While the impact of the TCJA will be national, some
areas like California and the Northeast will bear more of the burden.114
Some also anticipate diminished job growth and possibly fewer jobs
in high-tax areas, outside just the loss of construction jobs. Comparing “11
high-tax states . . . with 20 low-tax states . . . shows that private sector job
growth in the first six months of the year [since the TCJA] is 80 percent
higher in the low-tax states.”115 This is likely not directly due to the SALT
deduction cap, as these taxes still remain deductible as an expense for
businesses, but rather it is a result of the new tax provisions generally. 116
The response could also be in anticipation of higher taxes leading to
decreased disposable income.117 This means that taxpayers in the high-tax
states will have less to spend on non-necessities and businesses anticipate
this shift in spending abilities. Regardless, it is likely to heavily impact
108

Michelle Fox, Tax Bill Will Make Home Prices Plunge, Says NJ Congressman,
CNBC (Dec. 5, 2017, 3:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/05/tax-bill-will-make-njhome-prices-plunge-says-rep-josh-gottheimer.html.
109
Aimee Picchi, Where the GOP Tax Bill Won’t Help: Housing Prices, CBS NEWS
(Dec. 21, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gop-tax-bill-wont-help-housingprices/.
110
Id.
111
Andres Carbacho-Burgos & Mark Zandi, Housing Takes a Hit, MOODY’S ANALYTICS
(2018), https://www.moodysanalytics.com/webinars-on-demand/2018/housing-takes-a-hit.
112
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 26, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Opposition].
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Chuck DeVore, New York and Other High-Tax States Sue Over SALT Deduction
Cap While Jobs Follow Lower Taxes, FORBES (July 26, 2018, 5:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2018/07/26/new-york-and-other-high-tax-statessue-over-salt-deduction-cap-while-jobs-follow-lower-taxes/.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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taxpayers in high-tax states because there will be higher taxes with less
opportunity for financial growth.118
2. Corporations
Because the SALT deduction cap does not apply to corporations,
which can still deduct state and local taxes as a business expense,119 states
and localities may be incentivized to place a higher proportion of the SALT
burden on those businesses. Additionally, as discussed above, taxpayers in
high-tax states will have less disposable income because of their increased
tax bills.120 This may already be reflected in the increasingly bad business
climates in certain high-tax states, like New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut.121
There is also the potential harm to charities and nonprofit corporations
because of the TCJA.122 First, there is the fear that if state and local
governments have to cut spending, these organizations will receive fewer
funds.123 Charities are also concerned that, because of recent Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) guidance regarding charitable contribution
workarounds for the cap, individuals will donate less money.124
B. Impact on Governmental Agencies
While the diminished growth in business will impact taxpayers, it is
likely to have a greater impact on state governments. As businesses are
more likely to move to low-tax states, the high-tax states will lose these
major sources of tax revenue.125 Further, while states and localities could
previously provide tax incentives to retain these businesses, in the wake of
the harm that the SALT deduction cap will cause states and localities may
have to prioritize individual tax incentives instead.126
118

Id.
26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2018).
120
See supra Part IV.A.1.
121
See Jared Walczak et al., 2019 State Business Tax Climate Index, TAX FOUND. (Sept.
26, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/state-business-tax-climate-index/.
122
See National Council of Nonprofits, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1 Nonprofit
Analysis of the Final Tax Law, COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/sites/default/files/documents/tax-bill-summarychart.pdf.
123
Id.
124
See discussion infra Part V.
125
See Walczak, supra note 121, at 9–10.
126
See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Could States Fix the SALT Deduction Cap by Taxing
Pass-Throughs and Giving Their Owners a Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/could-states-fix-salt-deduction-cap-taxing-passthroughs-and-giving-their-owners-credit (discussing a similar idea as applied to passthrough entities).
119
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Another impact on the high-tax states will be a loss of residents.127
For example, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York had some of the
highest outbound migration rates for 2018, with tax policy decisions
playing a factor.128 In the future, without being able to deduct the full
amount of the SALT being paid, more high-income residents may seek to
move to low-tax states.129 This will create problems for the high-tax states
because it will mean a smaller revenue base.130 This will force high-tax
states into the solution they may have sought to avoid, namely cutting the
services they provide.131 On the other side, the influx of high-tax state
residents into other states will strain the resources of those states, which are
limited by their low tax rates.132
There is also the concern for the national economy, as economists
predict “that if fewer Americans moved to places like New York City and
the San Francisco Bay Area the US economy would shrink by about 9
percent a year . . . .”133 Thus, the impact is not limited to just high-tax
states, but to the nation as a whole.
V. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS BY STATES TO MITIGATE THE CAP
With New York as the trailblazer and New Jersey and Connecticut
following suit, states have been enacting different forms of legislation to
try to mitigate the effect of the SALT cap on their taxpayers.134 Noticeably,
these are all high-tax states that are likely to feel the effects of the cap most
harshly and include the bulk of the states currently suing the federal
government over this cap.135 Part A will discuss the first form of
legislation—the payroll workaround—and Part B will look at the second
form of legislation—the charitable contribution workaround.

127

See DeVore, supra note 115.
Katherine Loughead, Where Did Americans Move in 2018?, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 3,
2019), https://taxfoundation.org/where-did-americans-move-in-2018/.
129
Id.
130
See DeVore, supra note 115.
131
Id.
132
In fact, this concern was voiced by a Senator from Florida, which lacks a state
income tax, back when the SALT deduction came on the chopping block in 1986. See
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76. This still remains a concern today.
133
Gordon, supra note 46.
134
Frank Sammartino, How New York State Responded to the SALT Deduction Limit,
TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 14, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-new-yorkstate-responded-salt-deduction-limit.
135
See infra Part VI.
128

CAMPISANO (DO NOT DELETE)

540

11/15/2019 7:22 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:525

A. Payroll Tax Workaround
One of the options available to taxpayers in New York is to give
employers the choice to collect and pay a five percent payroll tax for
employees with more than $40,000 in annual wages.136 This would reduce
the taxpayers’ wages but it would also enable employees to take a tax credit
that would be subtracted from their taxes payable.137
To illustrate, if a taxpayer had a salary of $100,000 and paid state
income tax on this of $10,000, the employer would be permitted to reduce
the employees’ pay to $90,000, leaving him with the same tax base he
would have had if his state tax was fully deductible.138 The state would
then assess a corresponding income tax on the employer of $10,000 that the
employer would be legally obligated to pay.139 Finally, the taxpayer would
get either a credit against his state income tax for the amount of that payroll
tax or he could reduce his state income tax base by the amount of salary
that is subject to the new payroll tax.140 By swapping employees’ pay for
an income tax credit, this plan would keep states’ revenues essentially
unchanged and would not largely impact the taxpayer’s income.141
Although it would decrease the amount of income the taxpayer took home,
he would pay less federal income and payroll tax.142 Businesses would not
be harshly impacted either because they would be able to deduct the
amount as a business expense.143 Finally, by limiting this option to those
earnings above $40,000, the legislation ensures that the taxpayers will be
eligible for the tax credit.144 New York has been the only state thus far to
adopt this form of legislation.145

136

Employer Compensation Expense Program, 2018 N.Y. LAWS 59, § 852 (LexisNexis
2018). See also Rodha Mohan & Lai King Lam, Why IRS Will Struggle to Respond to State
SALT Cap Bypass, LAW360 (May 31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/newjersey/articles/10
48972/why-irs-will-struggle-to-respond-to-state-salt-cap-bypass; Joseph C. Mandarino,
Evaluation of Efforts to Combat the SALT Deduction Cap, 158 ST. TAX NOTES 689, 691
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-state/charitable-giving/evaluation-effo
rts-combat-salt-deduction-cap/2018/02/19/26sz8?highlight=Evaluation%20of%20Efforts%2
0to%20Combat%20the%20SALT%20Deduction%20Cap.
137
Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691.
144
Sammartino, supra note 134.
145
Id. See also Employer Compensation Expense Program, 2018 N.Y. Laws 59, § 852
(LexisNexis 2018).
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While this legislation is less likely to run afoul of the IRS, it relies
completely upon employer participation.146 At the moment, it appears to
have little traction with that group.147 This may be because it offers no real
incentive to participate.148 It could also be that, if the IRS were to issue
guidance disallowing this structure, it could create a headache for the
companies that have participated. This also presents problems in figuring
out the burden to match to the withholding149 and would cause
administrative difficulties for the IRS, for companies involved, and
possibly for the taxpayers that utilize this method. These difficulties could
translate into increased preparation costs for taxes. Finally, workers may
be reluctant to take advantage of this program because it will mean a
smaller paycheck.150
B. Charitable Contributions Tax Workaround
Under the charitable contribution workaround, which has been
enacted by New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut in one form or
another, the states create state-administered trust funds, to which residents
can contribute.151 Taxpayers that contribute receive a credit against their
state income taxes equal to a set percentage of their contribution in the year
after the contribution.152 States can offer full-credit programs, that allow
taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar credit for amounts paid.153 Alternatively,
states can offer partial credit, granting taxpayers credits for less than 100
percent of their charitable contributions or the states can offer a private
credit model, in which taxpayers give to private organizations to receive
credit.154 So far, no state has offered a full-credit option and the partialcredit method seems to be the predominant method in attempting to get
around the SALT deduction cap.155

146

See Sammartino, supra note 134.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691.
150
Id.
151
See 2018 N.Y. Laws 59 § 850 (LexisNexis 2018) (New York); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54:4-66.9 (LexisNexis 2018) (New Jersey); 2018 Conn. Acts 49 (LexisNexis 2018)
(Connecticut). See Timothy M. Todd, Exogeneity vs. Endogeneity in Section 170’s Quid
Pro Quo Test, 161 TAX NOTES 65, 66–67 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/taxnotes-state/tax-policy/exogeneity-vs-endogeneity-section-170s-quid-pro-quotest/2018/10/01/28d98; Amandeep Grewal, The Charitable Contribution Strategy: An
Ineffective SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX REV. 203, 205–09 (2018).
152
Todd, supra note 151, at 38.
153
Grewal, supra note 151, at 208–10.
154
Grewal, supra note 151, at 208–09.
155
Id.
147
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The idea behind this plan is that, while there are limits to the
charitable contribution deduction taxpayers are allowed to take in the new
tax code, the limits are much higher than the $10,000 deduction allowed for
SALT.156 By “donating” the money to a charitable fund instead of paying
the same amount via taxes, taxpayers would be able to deduct it as a
charitable contribution.157 On the state and local end, the preference for
partial credit is predicated on the idea that keeping the deduction below 100
percent allows the states to make up for the increased administrative
expenses.158 Even though the taxpayer does not receive credit for the full
amount, they still receive considerable benefits.159
Many states have used this method to provide credits for taxpayer
contributions to or for the use of entities listed under the charitable
contribution section of the code previously.160 Prior to these SALT
workarounds, there was no official ruling or position either for or against
these credits by the IRS, and informal guidance had been on the side of
allowing these credits.161 This new state legislation, however, would
expand these provisions to a place likely not contemplated by the informal
guidance. Therefore, in June 2018, the Treasury Department and the IRS
announced their intention to regulate treatment of these contributions based
on “longstanding federal tax law principles.”162
The IRS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to disallow the
charitable contribution workaround stating that, “[a] payment of money
generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor
expects a substantial benefit in return.”163 The IRS recognized the dual
character of some payments, even where the taxpayer receives a “nominal
benefit” less than the value of the payment.164 The IRS’s position allows
the deduction “but only to the extent the amount donated or the fair market
value of the property transferred by the taxpayer exceeds the fair market
value of the benefit received in return, and only if the excess amount was
156
Amandeep Grewal, The Proposed SALT Regulations May Be Doomed, 103 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE 75, 75 (2018). See also 26 U.S.C. § 170(b) (2018) (setting the limitations on
individual’s charitable contribution deduction, with cash contributions being limited to 60%
of the taxpayer’s AGI and contributions of capital gains property being limited to 30% of
AGI subject to other additional limitations).
157
Grewal, supra note 156, at 75.
158
Sammartino, supra note 134.
159
Id.
160
Grewal, supra note 151, at 205, 210.
161
Grewal, supra note 151, at 211–12.
162
Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563,
43,565 (Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter IRS Guidance].
163
Id. at 43,563 (quoting United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116
(1986)).
164
Id.
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transferred with the intent of making a gift.”165 This means that very few,
if any, transfers under this workaround will actually qualify for charitable
deductibility.
The IRS also addressed the fact that many of these states have offered
credits for charitable contributions prior to this legislation.166 The IRS,
however, noted that, because there was no cap on the SALT deduction in
those systems, the increased charitable contribution deduction necessarily
entailed a decreased SALT deduction because the taxpayers were receiving
credits lowering their state and local tax bills.167 Therefore, there was no
tangible difference. Under new legislation, this system would enable
taxpayers to get around legislatively enacted limits in a way that was not a
concern before.168
In light of this, the Treasury Department and the IRS stated that
“when a taxpayer receives or expects to receive a state or local tax credit in
return for a payment or transfer to any entity listed in section 170(c) [the
charitable contribution deduction section], the receipt of this tax benefit
constitutes a quid pro quo that may preclude a full deduction.”169 These
rules would apply regardless of whether the taxpayer was taking advantage
of a pre-existing charitable contribution provision or one enacted in the
wake of the newest tax reform.170 Thus, the rule going forward is that “the
amount otherwise deductible as a charitable contribution must generally be
reduced by the amount of the state or local tax credit received or expected
to be received.”171 This effectively eliminates all benefits the states are
attempting to bestow on their taxpayers and makes the new SALT
workaround provisions useless with respect to their intended purpose.172
The IRS’s proposed regulation is already concerning many parties, as
it implicates not only the credits given related to the SALT workaround,
but also the credit programs that were in place before.173 Many states that
have utilized these credits in the past have written to the Treasury
Department and the IRS raising concerns regarding the probable effects on

165

Id. (citing United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986)).
Id. at 43,564.
167
Id.
168
IRS Guidance, supra note 162, at 43,565.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. But see Joseph Bankman et al., State Responses to Federal Tax Reform:
Charitable Tax Credits, 87 ST. TAX NOTES 433 (2018) (arguing that this approach goes
against the weight of legal authority as the value of the deduction has not been treated as an
item of income under section 61).
173
IRS Guidance, supra note 162, at 43,571.
166
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organizations and taxpayers in the states.174 Particularly notable is the
tension between states that have attempted to newly implement
workarounds and those that have pre-existing state tax credit schemes
caught in the crosshairs.175 Charitable organizations have also expressed
their concerns over the anticipated decrease in contributions.176 The
proposed changes, however, have found support to the extent that they
prevent states from circumventing the SALT cap in place, and also for the
reallocation of values caused by the disallowance of pre-existing credits.177
Thus, even attempts to clarify have left numerous holes in the general
understanding of section 170 deductions and how the IRS will actually
apply the new rule remains uncertain.178
VI. JUDICIAL ATTEMPT BY STATES TO MITIGATE CAP
In July 2018, four states—New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Maryland—(collectively the “Plaintiff States”) filed suit against Steven
Mnuchin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
the Treasury; the U.S. Department of Treasury; David Kautter, in his
official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of the IRS; the IRS; and,
finally, the United States itself (collectively the “Defendants”).179 The suit
was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
174
See Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Governor, State of N.Y., to Charles P. Rettig,
Comm’r, IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/ato
ms/files/RettigLetter2018.pdf; Letter from Michael Hartman, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t
Revenue, to the IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/201
8-40988_xColorado-DOR-salt.pdf.
175
Compare Letter from Rob Woodall, Member of Cong., et al., to Steven T. Mnuchin
et al. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://woodall.house.gov/sites/woodall.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_upl
oaded/Letter%20to%20Treaury%20and%20IRS%20on%20Proposed%20Rule.pdf,
with
Letter from Andrew Cuomo to Charles P. Rettig, supra note 174.
176
Letter from Kristi Knous, President, Cmty. Found. of Greater Des Moines, et al., to
the IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/201841102_2018-10-11-Hamond-Jeff-in.pdf.
177
See Letter from Rob Woodall to Steven T. Mnuchin, supra note 175; Letter from
Cindi McDonald, Superintendent, Waukee Cmty. Sch. to Merrill Feldstein, Senior Counsel,
IRS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/2018-42888_x_01
45_-for-regs-schools-WCS-_Cindi-McDonald_.pdf (supporting the new guidance because it
will disincentivize contributions to private schools over public schools).
178
See generally Todd, supra note 151. Todd argues that the IRS should make an
exogenous-endogenous distinction when determining deductibility, such that benefits that
arise independently of or outside a specific taxing authority (exogenous) would reduce the
deductible amount and benefits that arise from within a specific taxing authority
(endogenous) would not be considered in determining deductibility. Id. This approach
would solve at least one problem that plagues the new IRS guidance, in justifying the now
contradictory system of allowing federal deductibility despite the quid pro quo nature of the
federal deduction. Id.
179
Complaint at 8–10, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
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New York and was dismissed on September 30th, 2019.180 The Plaintiff
States had been seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the new cap on
SALT deductions violated the United States Constitution and an injunction
to bar the cap’s enforcement.181 This part examines the issues the Plaintiff
States faced with regard to jurisdiction and the merits of their claims. 182
Each subsection looks at the arguments advanced by both parties and the
district court’s resolution of these arguments.
A. Jurisdiction
This section examines issues the Plaintiff States faced in regard to
jurisdiction. It will first examine the arguments put forth by the Plaintiff
States and the Defendants and then examine the district court’s disposition
of these issues.
1. The Parties Arguments
The Plaintiff States based their standing on the fact that they “and
their residents will suffer legally cognizable harm because of the new cap
on the SALT deduction, and an order invalidating the new cap would
redress the Plaintiff States’ injuries.”183 While the complaint included
allegations that could reasonably meet the minimum constitutional
requirements
for
standing—namely
injury,
causation
and
redressability184—the Defendants’ motion to dismiss questioned whether
the Plaintiff States themselves had suffered an injury in fact or whether
their harm was secondary to that of their citizens.185 Further, the
Defendants argued that even if the injury alleged was in fact an injury to

180
Id. at 1; New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019).
181
Complaint, supra note 179, at 8. The Defendants never filed a reply to the
complaint. Instead, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, both for lack of
standing and for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Motion to Dismiss,
New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. This motion is discussed throughout the
remainder of Part VI. The Plaintiff States replied to this and made a cross-motion for
summary judgment, which will also be relied on throughout Part VI. Opposition, supra note
112.
182
As of the time of publication, it is unclear whether the Plaintiff States will appeal this
decision, although New York’s governor has indicated it is a possibility. Jonathan Stempel,
Judge Dismisses U.S. States’ Challenge to Trump Tax Cap on SALT Deductions, REUTERS
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxes-lawsuit/judge-dismisses-u-sstates-challenge-to-trump-tax-cap-on-salt-deductions-idUSKBN1WF1OB?utm.
183
Complaint, supra note 179, at 9.
184
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515 (2006) (discussing these
requirements for standing). See also Complaint, supra note 179.
185
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 3–4.
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the states, it was not concrete enough.186
The Plaintiff States, in their reply to the Defendants, pointed to three
particular, potential sovereign harms: (1) the cap would cause them to
depart from their current taxation and fiscal policies; (2) it would cause the
Plaintiff States to lose specific sources of revenue, like sales tax and real
estate transfer taxes; and (3) because it targeted specific states, the principle
of equal sovereign immunity was violated.187 In response, the Defendants
argued that: (1) this tax does not force the states to make any choice, as
they can keep taxing and spending as they wish and taxpayers will simply
have a larger tax bill; (2) these revenue sources are not specific enough to
confer standing; and (3) this tax does not treat states differently, but rather
treats all taxpayers the same.188
Both parties also addressed the issue of the political question doctrine.
This doctrine is implicated when a policy determination is best left to
branches of government other than the judiciary.189 The Defendants
pointed to the “especially rigorous” standing inquiry used when the court
must determine the constitutionality of another branches’ action.190 While
the Plaintiff States attempted to contest this characterization, the
Defendants argued the Plaintiff States ultimately failed to provide a
standard by which to judge the fairness of the cap.191 Finally, the
Defendants challenged the Plaintiff States’ request for injunctive relief.192
The Defendants claimed that injunctive relief is barred by the AntiInjunctive Act (AIA), which provides that no suit to restrain the assessment
or collection of any tax can be maintained by a court.193 Thus, overall the
Plaintiff States faced numerous issues even showing the district court had
the ability to hear this matter.

186

Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 8–9.
Opposition, supra note 112, at 6–9.
188
Reply and Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–6, New York v.
Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019)
[hereinafter Reply].
189
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 4. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (discussing political questions as an impediment to standing).
190
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)).
191
Reply, supra note 188, at 8–9. This is especially important because they did not
claim that any cap on the SALT deduction would be invalid, just that this cap is invalid.
Reply, supra note 188, at 9–10.
192
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 14.
193
Id.
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2. District Court’s Resolution
The district court ultimately found that the Plaintiff States had
standing.194 It relied upon the Plaintiff States’ second alleged harm, namely
that the cap could potentially cause the Plaintiff States to lose a specific
source of revenue.195 The court relied upon Wyoming v. Oklahoma, in
which the Supreme Court held that a state could establish a direct injury in
the form of loss of a specific tax revenue.196 In this case, the Plaintiff
States identified one such revenue in the form of real estate transfer
taxes.197 The court further found that this allegation was not too
speculative as there was “no reason to doubt the basic economic logic” of
this prediction.198
As to the political question doctrine, the district court pointed to the
fact that the Plaintiff States were not asking the court to resolve a matter of
opinion nor were they asking the court to make an unprecedented
intervention in the political process.199 The Plaintiff States were simply
asking the court to use familiar tools of constitutional interpretation.200
Further, the lack of standard to judge the tax’s fairness went to the merits of
the case.201 Thus, the doctrine was not implicated. Finally, in regard to the
AIA, the court found that the statute did not bar the Plaintiff States’ suit as
Congress provided no other means to challenge this tax.202 Therefore, there
was no jurisdictional bar to the Plaintiff States’ claims
B. The Merits of the Plaintiff States’ Claims
This subsection will examine the merits of the Plaintiff States’ claims,
first by looking at their allegations, the Defendants’ response to those
allegations, and any other case law that could impact the case if it does go
forward. This part will then look at the disposition of these claims by the
district court.
1. Sixteenth Amendment Argument
The Sixteenth Amendment gives the federal government the power to
collect income tax and reads, “[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and

194

New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at
*23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019).
195
Id. at *19.
196
Id. at *20 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992)).
197
Id. at *21.
198
Id. at *22.
199
Id. at *32–33.
200
Mnuchin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at *33.
201
Id.
202
Id. at *24–25 (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984)).
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collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration.”203 The Plaintiff States argued that the federal government
had violated this Amendment by capping the SALT deduction.204 The
complaint discussed the long history behind the passing of this Amendment
and the fierce opposition it faced from states at the time of ratification.205
Specifically, states at that time were wary of the Amendment because they
feared the ability of the federal government to interfere with the states’
taxation of its citizens.206 The Plaintiff States argued that the legislative
history in conjunction with the Plaintiff States’ reliance on the perpetuity of
the SALT deduction in all former legislation caused the current limitation
to run afoul of this Amendment.207
The Defendants, on the other side, denied that the Sixteenth
Amendment limits Congress’s authority to set taxes based merely on the
history of its ratification and without any textual support.208 The Sixteenth
Amendment makes no provision for the states, either explicit or implicit.209
The Plaintiff States, in their reply to the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, did not focus as heavily on the Sixteenth Amendment argument
and seemed to shift gears to argue “the States’ original and sovereign
‘power of taxation,’ which predates the Founding . . . was incorporated into
our constitutional structure.”210 The Plaintiff States then relied on the
history of the SALT deduction and the continued allowance of a “neartotal” SALT deduction to argue that the departure from this past was
telling.211 They argued if Congress actually had the power to extensively
narrow SALT’s deductibility, it would have done so before now.212 The
Defendants, however, pointed out that, throughout its history, the SALT
deduction has been limited in one way or another.213
The Defendants also underscored the fact that while there was pushback against the ratification of the Amendment by the states, the SALT
deduction was never even brought up.214 Overall, the Plaintiff States faced
a major issue in the lack of protection the Sixteenth Amendment provides,
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Complaint, supra note 179, at 49.
Complaint, supra note 179, at 42.
See id.
Complaint, supra note 179, at 41–42.
See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 21–20.
See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 20–26; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Opposition, supra note 112, at 17–18.
Id.
Opposition, supra note 112, at 15.
Reply, supra note 188, at 12. See also supra Part III.
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181.
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as even a broad reading could fail to implicate the states’ interest in
maintaining a tax base with the ability to pay.
It is important to note, aside from these arguments, that the Plaintiff
States’ broad reading of the protections the Sixteenth Amendment provides
goes against prior Supreme Court precedent that has stated “that the whole
purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed
from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income
was derived.”215 Additionally, state tax courts have also found that states
have a right to impose an income tax independent of the Sixteenth
Amendment and that a state’s ability to impose a tax arises out of a
sovereign right and not from the Sixteenth Amendment.216
2. Tenth Amendment Argument
The Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from
invading the sovereign authority of the states and also requires the federal
government to respect the equal sovereignty of the states.217 The Plaintiff
States argued that the federal government had violated this Amendment
through the SALT deduction cap.218 The heart of this contention was that,
by eliminating the full deduction, the federal government was forcing
certain states to choose between changing their tax policies or foregoing the
benefits of the TCJA.219
There are of course limits to the extent to which the federal
government can impose its will on states via fiscal policies. In Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held that the check
on the federal government should come from the political process.220 In
essence, the state’s representation in the federal government should
represent its interests in a manner that conforms with the Tenth
Amendment.221 This, however, advances the Plaintiff States’ argument that
they were denied a fair political process in this matter because of the
rushed, highly partisan way in which the tax bill was passed.222
Another factor here is the coercive nature of the federal government’s
215
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916). It is notable that this case
comes from early in the federal income taxes’ history and at that time it was thought of as
merely a way around apportionment to the states. This could suggest a history contrary to,
and almost as deep rooted as, the one argued by the Plaintiff States.
216
Hanson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 2002 Minn. Tax LEXIS 23, at *6–7 (Minn. T.C.
Oct. 15, 2002).
217
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 29–30.
218
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 29.
219
See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10–12.
220
469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
221
See id.
222
Complaint, supra note 179, at 45.
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enactment. New York v. United States involved a state challenge against
the sanctions and incentives provided by the federal government to
encourage compliance with a federal regulatory program. 223 The Court in
that case pointed out that fiscal incentives by the federal government would
be upheld, but they could not be coercive to the states.224 The major
concern in that case was political accountability;225 when the federal
government forces the states to give effect to federal legislative policy, the
state governments have no autonomy but remain accountable to their
constituents.226 The SALT deduction cap could be viewed, and has been
expressed to be, an incentive to get certain states to change their fiscal
policies.227 Thus, the SALT deduction cap goes to the heart of the
accountability of the Tenth Amendment argument.
The Defendants, on the other hand, relied on New York v. United
States to support their argument that if a power is delegated to Congress,
such as the taxing power, then the Tenth Amendment will disclaim the
reservation of this power to the state.228 They argued that the SALT
deduction cap is an exercise of that taxing power and “that is the end of the
matter.”229
The Defendants also argued that the SALT deduction cap is in no way
impeding the states’ ability to continue taxing their citizenry, nor is it
actually impairing their ability to spend how they wish.230 They relied on
South Carolina v. Baker, in which the court upheld a tax-based incentive
that was provided to states to alter their bond issuing practices.231 Thus, the
Defendants similarly argued that the cap may be making state taxation
more difficult.232 This is either because people may not want to continue to
pay the taxes required to maintain the level of public service without
receiving a deduction or if the states do cut the rates, they will not have the
requisite funds.233 Despite this, the Defendants argued that the federal
government is still leaving the states with a choice and are not exerting
impermissible force because of this.234
223

505 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1992).
See id. at 176.
225
Id. at 168–69.
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Id.
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See Complaint, supra note 179, at 6.
228
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 13, 31.
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Id.
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Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 14, 31.
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Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 32 (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 513–15 (1988)).
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In replying to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff States
argued that the coercion used here is the same that was expressly
disallowed in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
where the court held that Congress cannot “put so much pressure on States
as to effectively undermine their sovereignty.”235 That is what the Plaintiff
States claimed was occurring.236 Additionally, the Plaintiff States pointed
to comments made in the news and by lawmakers regarding the SALT
cap.237 Many involved attacks on how the Plaintiff States’ governments are
run and expressed a desire to challenge those states.238 The Defendants,
however, in their reply, pointed to the fact that these comments do not
affect the constitutionality of the provision, meaning it is constitutional
regardless of the true intent behind them.239
3. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution Argument
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States . . . .”240 This concern did not come up
explicitly in either of the parties’ arguments, perhaps because the federal
income taxes at issue were, by their nature, not uniform throughout the
states. Despite that, it merits mention as it could play a more important
role on appeal.
4. District Court’s Resolution
The district court interpreted all three of the above as one claim,
resting on two separate arguments.241 The Plaintiff States’ first argument,
in the court’s interpretation, was that any attempt to eliminate or
substantially curtail the SALT deduction upsets the constitutional
balance.242 While the court agreed with the Plaintiff States that the change
to the SALT deduction was unprecedented and the court may properly
consider historic understanding and practice in ruling on constitutionality,
the court held that novelty is not fatal in this context, it merely informs the
235
Opposition, supra note 112, at 26 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 576–77 (2012)).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Opposition, supra note 112, at 29–30.
239
Reply, supra note 188, at 19.
240
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
241
New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at
*34–35 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019).
242
Id. at *35.
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courts understanding of structural limitations.243 Rather, the court found it
must ask if the failure of the federal government to previously impose a
condition comes from such a structural limitation.244 The court relied upon
South Carolina v. Baker for the proposition that just because a certain tax
had always been exempt from federal taxation does not mean the
exemption is frozen, as long as there is no constitutional bar to it.245 The
court further relied on Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company.246
and Lyeth v. Hoey247 to find that the federal government has plenary power
of taxation and as the Plaintiff States did not point to any constitutional
principal that would bar Congress in this instance, there was no
constitutional bar to the SALT cap enactment.248 Therefore, the Plaintiff
States claim failed in regard to this argument.249
The Plaintiff States’ second argument, in the court’s interpretation,
was that the cap was “an unlawful effort by Congress to wield its
regulatory authority in a way that coerces specifically targeted states.”250
The court, however, declined to look into the motives of Congress in
enacting the cap as “an otherwise valid federal law does not offend the
Constitution simply because it seeks to affect state policies.”251 Thus, the
court looked to the effects of the cap, not the motive behind it.252 The court
ultimately found that the harms here did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation because the consequences were not so harmful that
the States had “no real option but to acquiesce.”253 Thus, the Plaintiff
States’ claims survived attacks on the district court’s jurisdiction to hear
their claim, but the claims ultimately failed on the merits.
While there is some resolution of this matter now, there is the
possibility of appeal.254 Thus, it is important to understand the limitations
of the Plaintiff States’ case moving forward on appeal in order to
understand the small likelihood the case has of advancing. Further, even if
the Plaintiff States do ultimately prevail, and the cap is repealed, there will
still be a hole in the budget that the increased revenue the cap provided was
243

Id. at *35–37.
Id. at *38.
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Id. at *40–41.
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305 U.S. 188 (1938).
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Mnuchin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at *38–39.
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Id. at *45 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
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Therefore, some other method of reform would be

VII. STATUTORY REFORM AS AN ALTERNATIVE
It is clear, based on the impact the TCJA is likely to have, that the
SALT provision, as it stands, cannot endure.255 It is also clear that the
legislative actions by the states and municipalities have either failed or are
unlikely to succeed in getting around the new SALT cap.256 Additionally,
the judicial attempt by New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland
is not likely to succeed, as the case has been dismissed and faces some very
serious issues on appeal.257 Yet, even if the Plaintiff States do succeed and
the provision is repealed, it would perhaps be better to alter the statute
instead of eliminating any kind of limitations on SALT, considering
legislative intent and concerns over creating an even greater national
deficit.258 Reports regarding the TCJA show that this cap, in addition to
other tax law changes, will raise about $688 billion.259 The Joint
Committee on Taxation expects federal expenditures260 for SALT
deductions to decrease from $100.9 billion to $24.4 billion from fiscal year
2017 to fiscal year 2020, making this a large revenue raiser in the TCJA.261
Therefore, the best option available is to amend the SALT provision.
The current law applies a blanket cap of $10,000 on taxpayers
regardless of income.262 Instead of imposing a cap on deductions from
income, which does not account for differences in income, the SALT
provision should be amended so that the SALT deductions phase out based
on the taxpayers AGI to a minimum $10,000 deduction. AGI is the total
income subject to tax, minus “above-the-line deductions,” which do not
include itemized deductions.263 The use of AGI to determine the amount of
255

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.
257
See supra Part VI.
258
See supra Part III.
259
STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
260
A tax expenditure is defined as “the deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, and
other tax preferences that represent departures from a ‘normal’ tax code.” William
McBride, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2013),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf. This idea was first introduced by
Stanley Surrey, who noted that many tax preferences resemble spending. Id.
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STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021, tbl. 1 (Comm. Print 2018).
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26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2018). There is, however, a $5,000 limit if the taxpayer’s
filing status is married, filing jointly. Id.
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JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.
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deduction that can be taken is common to many phase-outs within the IRC
and is utilized in other deductions.264 By having it phase out to a minimum
of $10,000, however, it preserves the deduction to some extent even for
those with a high AGI.
Utilizing this method will redistribute some of the impact from
geographical locations. Just because the taxpayers are in a high-propertytax state does not mean the SALT provision will necessarily impact them.
Rather, it will only impact them if they have a corresponding higher level
of income. The counterargument to this is that the same states will still be
impacted more harshly because income tends to be higher in these areas.
While this is a valid concern, this method is still a better alternative
because it honors the goal of a progressive income taxation: higher taxes
for those with higher income.
This plan would also better reflect certain limitations that were placed
on the SALT deduction prior to the TCJA. Before the reforms, highincome and some upper-middle-income taxpayers were subject to the
Alternative Minimum Tax (the “AMT”).265 The AMT limited the amount
of the deductions taxpayers could take if they made over a certain income
level to ensure that these taxpayers would not have an inordinately small
tax bill.266 With the TCJA, the amount of income needed to run afoul of
the AMT is much higher, meaning it impacts fewer taxpayers now.267 By
implementing an AGI-based phase-out, high-income taxpayers that did not
get the deduction before because of their income levels will likely not get it
now, maintaining the status quo, and strictly middle-class taxpayers that
likely should have gotten the deduction but were disallowed because of the
formerly broad reach of the AMT will be able to take it, creating a more
equitable tax system.268
Overall, this is a better alternative than what is currently in place
because it provides a workable compromise that will limit the impact on
high-property tax states but also, to some extent, allow the government to
recover some of the revenue lost in other tax cuts in the TCJA. This
alternative strikes a compromise between the high- and low-tax states in
terms of where the tax burden falls, without a disproportionate burden on
the middle-class taxpayers of high-tax states. Thus, while the increase in
the cap protects those that cannot pay, because there still is a cap, there will
264

See 26 U.S.C. § 221 (for phase out for student loan interest deduction); former 26
U.S.C. § 68 (prior to the TCJA taxpayers faced a phase out of itemized deductions based on
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Scott Ahroni, Congress and the SALT Deduction, CPA J. (Jan. 2018),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/01/22/congress-salt-deduction/.
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be the decreased federal tax expenditure, which is necessary to support the
other changes under the TCJA.
In New York v. Mnuchin, both parties pointed out that there is another
option that would mitigate the harm caused by the SALT deduction cap:
namely, the states most affected could cut spending and subsequently cut
taxes for their citizens.269 This could disincentivize migration caused by
the SALT deduction cap and cure that specific revenue issue for high-tax
states.270 Proponents of this also feel that by re-examining budgets, hightax states would still be able to provide “high-value service at minimum
cost.”271
While this option may be lucrative from a strictly fiscal standpoint, it
completely disregards the spirit of federalism. If the states were to cut
spending, it would not be because of any sovereign choice of their own, but
rather in spite of their own choices.272 The citizens of those states made the
choice to live in the state and pay higher property and income taxes
because they wanted the increased social services, such as better school
systems.273 For example, high-tax states like New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Maryland are among the top ten states with the best school systems. 274 On
the other hand, low-tax states dominate the lower spots on the ranking.275
It would be wrong for the federal government to step in and force the hand
of both the state governments and the citizens of those states.276
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, high-tax states cutting their
budgets could have a large-scale impact on the national economy.277 This
is because high-tax states generally receive a fraction of the state’s baseline
contribution of federal taxes.278 On the other hand, many low-tax states
receive a multiple of their contribution.279 For example, Mississippi and
Louisiana rank first and second for percentage of federal aid that makes up
269

See supra Part VI. See also Chris Edwards, Tax Reform and Interstate Migration,
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state revenue respectively, and both are low-tax states.280 On the other
hand, New Jersey and Connecticut rank forty-first and forty-second
respectively281 and both are high-tax states. By cutting taxes and spending,
these high-tax states would be remitting less, having a big impact on lowtax states.282 Further, the fact that these low-tax states would benefit from
what amounts to a federal subsidy cuts against their prior opposition to the
SALT deductions on the grounds that it was a federal subsidy to high-tax
states.283
Therefore, while there might be other alternatives to the issues caused
by the SALT deduction cap, they are fraught with issues that the AGI
phase-out is not.284 Namely, the AGI phase-out would not create a
disparity in detriment among the states and would not force states to make
difficult choices that undermine their sovereignty.285 It would also be less
likely to have unforeseen consequences regarding the distribution of federal
money among states, nor will it have a major impact on federal revenues.286
VIII. CONCLUSION
The new SALT deduction cap has created a number of issues in its
wake. It appears that the cap has great potential to impact many different
constituencies and in unexpected ways. Those most impacted are a number
of high-tax states, as well as residents of those states and businesses located
within those states.287 The potential harm that could be caused ranges from
decreases in property values, to fewer social services provided in the hightax states.288 There is also the potential for less federal revenue overall if
states cut back on their taxes. Additionally, the IRS response to
workarounds for this cap will potentially impact charitable funds
nationwide.289 Considering the state of the situation, there needs to be
some form of change to the SALT deduction cap.
A number of high-tax states, starting with New York, have passed
state legislation to circumvent the effects of the cap.290 While the payroll
workaround will likely not be disallowed by IRS regulation, it is unlikely
280
Katherine Loughead, Which States Rely the Most on Federal Aid?, TAX FOUND. (Jan.
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employers will utilize this, making it an ineffective solution.291 States have
also attempted to provide state and local tax credits for taxpayers’
payments to charitable contributions.292 This legislative mechanism,
however, has already run afoul of the IRS, which will only allow charitable
contribution deductions to the extent that no tax credit was received for
it.293 This interpretation has also subsequently created numerous issues.
Thus, this is also an ineffective solution.
Finally, high-tax states New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Connecticut have sought relief from the cap through the courts.294 They
argue that the cap violates their legally protected rights under the Tenth
Amendment, the Sixteenth Amendment, and Article 8 Section 1 of the
Constitution.295 While they make some arguments for their case, their
complaint has already been dismissed and their success on appeal is not
likely.296 Further, looking at the consequences, their unlikely victory
would mean the invalidation of this new limitation in the IRC. Because the
federal government makes up a large amount of the revenue lost due to
other tax cuts in the TCJA through the SALT provision, this could have
serious implications for the national deficit.297 If the states are not
successful, however, all of the above unintended consequences of the new
provision have a high likelihood of coming to pass.
Therefore, the best possible option is legislative reform of the IRC and
a phase-out of the SALT deduction based on AGI would best serve the
goals sought to be accomplished through this reform.298 Because it would
be based solely on income, this phase-out would avoid over-taxing lowerand middle-income taxpayers, one of the main pitfalls of the current,
unworkable deduction cap. Further, this reform would effectuate a
compromise that is workable for both high- and low-tax states,299 meaning
that, in the end, no state would be left with salt in its wounds.

291

Id.
2018 N.Y. Laws 59 § 850 (LexisNexis 2018) (New York); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:466.9 (LexisNexis 2018) (New Jersey); 2018 Conn. Acts 49 (LexisNexis 2018)
(Connecticut).
293
IRS Guidance, supra note 162, at 43,565.
294
Complaint, supra note 179.
295
Id.
296
See supra Part VI.
297
STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
298
See supra Part VII.
299
See supra Part VII.
292

